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1.  Introduction 
 
 This paper addresses two influential ways of thinking about which 
political principles we ought to adopt.  The first way of thinking starts with 
expectations about how persons ought to relate to one another in political 
discourse.  Political principles are justified by reference to these expectations.  
The second way of thinking starts with certain values around which, it is 
claimed, people ought to structure their lives.  Political principles are then 
justified by reference to these values.  These approaches to political 
justification are in competition, and arguments for political principles of 
Toleration and beyond can be made on either approach.   
 
 In the work of John Rawls we find an example of the first, 
‘Constructivist’, approach.  Constructivist values are taken to be appropriate 
in political justification because people exercising their practical reason to 
solve shared problems of justice would be committed to these values.  
Constructivist justificatory values are the values of people who aim at 
                                                
*   Versions of this paper have been presented at the Universities of Reading, Exeter, 
Manchester, and York.  I would like to thank the audiences at each of these events for 
their comments. 
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peaceful co-existence and profitable co-operation in political society.  
Different accounts of what counts as peaceful co-existence and, especially, 
profitable co-operation yield different Constructivist values.1  I shall offer an 
interpretation of Rawls whereby political principles of toleration and beyond 
are justified in virtue of the legitimate expectation that citizens themselves 
move beyond toleration in their political discourse by engaging with one 
another in public reason.   
 
 In the work of Joseph Raz we find an advocate of the second, 
‘Perfectionist’, approach.  Perfectionist justificatory values are to be found in a 
true moral theory, or true faith, and are claimed to be appropriate as 
justificatory values in virtue of their place in a true moral theory, or true faith.  
Raz argues for multiculturalist political principles which transcend Toleration 
by appeal to the perfectionist value of personal autonomy.   On this approach, 
we start with values embedded in a true moral theory and justify political 
principles by reference to these values, independent of the expectations we 
have of those to whom the principles are justified.  
 
 My argument will be that one way of pinpointing what is at issue 
between Perfectionist and Constructivist political justifications is to examine 
assumptions about the character of pluralism which inform each approach.  
These assumptions relate to the interpersonal attitudes we can expect of 
people facing shared problems of justice in conditions of pluralism.   I shall 
argue that these assumptions are not implicit in -- and cannot be derived from 
-- assumptions about the nature of pluralism, but must instead be argued for 
                                                
1  For a defence of a form of Constructivism which takes self-respect and its social conditions 
as a core justificatory value see my A Defence of Liberal Constructivism (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave, forthcoming 2002). 
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separately.  If, as Raz thinks, the most we can expect of persons in pluralism 
is toleration, then the justification of political principles beyond toleration -- 
for example, his multiculturalist principles -- cannot be constructed from 
expectations about the interpersonal attitudes people will adopt in pluralism.  
This makes sense of Raz’s Perfectionist appeal to a true moral theory to 
support justificatory values beyond political toleration.  Raz drives a wedge 
between what we can expect of persons and what we can justify as a matter of 
political principle with certain claims about the inevitability and 
appropriateness of conflict and hostility between people facing political 
problems, whereas these assumptions are absent from Rawls’ Constructivism.  
If Raz’s claims are true then Rawls’ approach is undermined, because the 
expectations of persons upon which it relies are unrealistic or inappropriate.  
If the most that can be expected of citizens is toleration then the logic of an 
appeal to perfectionist values to justify political principles beyond toleration 
is clarified and the Perfectionist approach to political justification becomes 
more attractive.   
 
 Let me clear the ground for this argument by making some brief 
remarks, in the next section, on the relationship between toleration qua 
personal attitude and toleration qua political principle. 
 
2.  Toleration:  Political and Personal  
 
 Toleration can be conceived as a personal attitude or as a political 
principle.  All defences of toleration as a personal attitude or as a political 
principle consist of arguments to show that toleration is the appropriate 
response to people who differ from us, and whom we dislike or of whom we 
disapprove.   
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 The object of toleration in the personal and political spheres is a 
disliked or disapproved of person.  Persons to be tolerated can differ from us 
in terms of their values, practices, beliefs, ends, forms of community and 
association, dispositions, tastes, or preferences.  By placing the personal and 
political concepts of toleration on spectrums of possible responses to disliked 
and disapproved of people we can clarify what toleration demands.  On each 
scale, toleration marks a substantial shift of principle or attitude; each stage 
subsequent to toleration should be thought of as transcending the previous 
stage.  Each stage represents a more positive set of responses to disliked and 
disapproved of differences than the preceding stage. 
 
Toleration as a political principle 
 1.  Repression  Perhaps the historically most common political 
response to disliked and disapproved of people has been the attempt to crush 
them, repress them, or drive them out.  Principles of repression are 
sometimes accompanied by a denial that the disliked and disapproved of 
person differs, deep down, from the repressor.  But repression born of the 
denial of difference repudiates its own basis, as repression would be 
unnecessary if it were true that difference did not exist.  However, not all 
political repression need contradict its own basis.  Repressive States can 
admit the existence of disliked and disapproved of people and attempt to 
justify their repression of these people by asserting the superiority of a world 
in which these people cease to differ from their repressors, and the 
acceptability of the use of State coercion to bring about this state of affairs. 
 
 2.  Official discouragement  Political agents who agree that a world 
free of disliked or disapproved of people is a better world, but who shrink 
from repression and the coercion required to create this world, might adopt a 
policy of official discouragement.  Here the attempt is to impede access to 
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ways of life incorporating the disliked or disapproved of differences without 
repressing people who already practice these ways of life.  We can see the 
distinction between repression and official discouragement by considering 
certain policies towards homosexuality.  The UK legislation overturned by 
the 1959 Wolfenden Report was repressive:  in making homosexual sex 
between men a crime this legislation aimed at preventing the practice of this 
kind of sex between existing gay men with the coercive power of the law.  But 
there are ways of being intolerant of homosexual people without attempting 
to repress them, as evinced in Section 28 of the Local Government Bill in the 
UK.2  Section 28 does not explicitly attempt to repress homosexual activity 
between gay people but aims instead to restrict the flow of information about 
homosexuality and thereby indirectly discourage young and closeted people 
from reflecting on their sexual preferences.   
 
 3.  Toleration  Toleration of disliked or disapproved of people requires 
refraining from repression and official discouragement of the practices 
constitutive of these differences.  Because interference can take the form of 
direct coercion, as in the case of repression, or insidious distortion, as in the 
case of discouragement, a political principle of toleration demands refraining 
from both. Principles of toleration are adopted by states when they refuse to 
                                                
2  Section 28 began as a Private Members Bill in 1986, and was eventually passed on 20 
February 1988 as part of the Local Government Bill.  Section 28 states that, 
 (1) A local authority shall not – 
     (a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of 
promoting homosexuality; 
     (b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality 
as a pretended family relationship. 
For more information see http://www.stonewall.org.uk/aoc/sec28.html 
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interfere with peoples’ pursuit of lifestyles associated with the disliked or 
disapproved of differences by means of force or propaganda.  But a tolerant 
society need not be one in which people who differ from the majority in 
disliked or disapproved of ways are invited to participate in the major 
political and social institutions of that society.  The political principle of 
toleration is negative:  it demands restraint with respect to the use of State 
power as it affects people who lead lives disliked or disapproved of by the 
majority, or by those with the most political power.  Of course, no thinker 
recommends that the scope of political toleration be unlimited.  Dislike and 
disapproval are often responses to aspects of persons causing genuine harm 
to others, or to society.  To accommodate these cases many thinkers use a 
‘harm principle’ to set the limits of toleration; where they disagree is on what 
constitutes harm. 
 
 4.  Political Inclusion  Toleration only demands action when abstention 
has not been observed, so as to put right the wrongs of official 
discouragement or repression.  But political responses to disliked and 
disapproved of people can go beyond toleration.  In addition to refraining 
from using political means to interfere with citizens’ pursuit of disliked and 
disapproved of lifestyles, the State can also attempt to include these people in 
its major political, social and economic institutions.  This principle can be 
used to justify equal opportunities legislation, including policies of positive 
discrimination and quota systems.  It can also underpin certain policies in 
education such as citizenship education, which asks that children be made to 
cultivate a range of skills necessary for good citizenship and a healthy degree 
of participation and interest in the political life of their society.  Most non-




 5.  Official Promotion  A final possibility is that the State actively 
promotes the differences which prompt dislike and disapproval in the 
institutions of civil society.  Policies designed to preserve minority languages, 
to protect opportunity for religious worship and traditional dress through 
restrictions on employment legislation and schooling requirements, and to 
enable same-sex and religion based polygamous marriages can all be justified 
by reference to principles of official promotion.  Official promotion is a strong 
principle variously defended as demanded by equal opportunity for self-
respect, a concern for the conditions of personal autonomy, equal concern 
and respect, and recognition of relationship between individual freedom and 
an agent’s social context, and other liberal and communitarian ideals. 
 
Personal Toleration  
 1.  Repression  As at the political level, a common response to disliked 
and disapproved of people at the personal level is an attempt to repress them.  
Repression is often motivated by hatred of others, disgust at their way of  life, 
or simple indifference towards them.  However, repression is also sometimes 
practised in the name of the salvation, character, or well-being of the 
repressed person.  As at the political level, repression at the personal level is 
sometimes accompanied by the claim that the repressed person is actually no 
different at heart from the repressor, and is contradictory in the same way.   
 
 2.  Toleration  The personal attitude of toleration demands a principled 
refusal to interfere with disliked or disapproved of people so as to change the 
aspects of the person which prompt dislike or disapproval.3  The personal 
attitude of toleration demands the principled avoidance of the use of force 
                                                
3  The qualification that restraint must be principled to count as toleration separates 
toleration from indifference. 
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against persons to eradicate their disliked or disapproved of differences.  It 
also prohibits the use of propaganda at the personal level.  As well as 
refraining from physical coercion as a way of changing the disliked or 
disapproved aspects of a person, the tolerant person does not engage in 
verbal bullying of people whom she dislikes and of whom she disapproves.  
This is not to say that the tolerant person does not attempt to persuade the 
person whom she tolerates of the error of her ways.  But there is an important 
difference (often hard to discern) between persuasion and harassment.  Anti-
abortionists who picket abortion clinics may conceive of themselves as 
attempting to persuade women entering the clinics of the error of their ways; 
but arguably they are actually harassing these women.  Although personal 
toleration is compatible with attempts at persuasion, such engagement is not 
demanded by personal toleration.  A person can exhibit the virtue of 
toleration by simply minding her own business.  As at the political level, no 
thinker argues that toleration at the personal level is appropriate with respect 
to all disliked and disapproved of people.  Some disliked and disapproved of 
people are intolerable. 
 
 3.  Engagement  Moving beyond toleration, the next level of response 
to disliked and disapproved of people is an attempt to engage with them as 
disliked and disapproved of people (i.e. without denial of their differences).  
The attitude of engagement demands that a person attempt to understand the 
values, practices, beliefs, ends, forms of community and association, 
dispositions, tastes, or preferences of people whom she dislikes and of whom 
she disapproves, either by attempting to engage them in some kind of 
discussion about their differences, or by imaginatively reconstructing their 
point of view.  Engagement requires empathy and an attempt at 
interpretation of the other person’s situation so as to understand the meaning 
of the symbols, practices, exchanges, and language that constitute that 
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situation.  But a person’s engagement with another does not require that she 
come to a complete understanding of the person whom she dislikes and of 
whom she disapproves, let alone that she overcome her dislike or 
disapproval.  Engagement simply requires that a person genuinely attempt to 
understand the disliked and disapproved of other in terms of her beliefs, 
motivations, the relationship between her beliefs and motivations, her 
history, her biography, her self-image, and her values.   
 
 As with toleration, it is not the case that engagement is always 
appropriate.  The limits of engagement might be set with the harm principle 
associated with toleration (remembering that engagement transcends 
toleration) in conjunction with some ‘comprehensibility’ principle.  The 
comprehensibility principle would establish the extent to which persons can, 
or ought to, engage with disliked and disapproved of others by specifying the 
points at which another’s beliefs or behaviour become incomprehensible.  
Some insane people might be beyond the limits of engagement in virtue of 
their cognitive disorder; some very evil people might exceed these limits in 
virtue of the monstrous nature of their values and preferences. 
 
 4.  Appreciation  The final level of personal response to difference asks 
that people overcome their dislike of one another even in the face of their 
disapproval of one another.  Friendship, family relations, and relations of 
love can all involve attitudes of appreciation.  Appreciation does not demand 
that a person deny her differences with others.  Such denials are damaging; 
when one person subsumes her identity in the identity of another it is a sign 
of an unhealthy relationship, not devoted love. 
 
 With these rough scales of response to difference in place, we can 
isolate three key questions of political justification. 
 10 
 
(1)  What sorts of political principles are justified in conditions of permanent 
pluralism?   
(2)  What sorts of personal attitudes can we legitimately expect people to 
adopt in response to one another in conditions of permanent pluralism? 
(3)  How, if at all, do the attitudes specified in (2) affect the justification of 
principles specified in (1)? 
 
 With respect to (1), no political philosopher on the contemporary scene 
defends political principles of repression.  Some thinkers defend political 
principles of official discouragement, but such defences are rare.  Most 
contemporary political philosophers defend some principles of toleration, 
and all non-libertarian liberal thinkers defend some principles beyond 
toleration.  The principles specified in answer to (1) will in some part provide 
an answer to (2):  people ought to adopt those attitudes demanded by the 
political principles of (1).  With respect to question (3), one way of seeing how 
the attitudes specified in answer to (2) must affect the principles specified in 
answer to (1) is through examination of the argument for political toleration 
from pluralism.  This argument purports to justify political principles of 
toleration without reference to personal attitudes of toleration, and by 
reference only to the incommensurable nature of the differences that contribute 
to pluralism.  In criticism of this argument I shall show that some 
assumptions about citizens’ personal attitudes must be made before political 
toleration can be claimed to be appropriate.  Revealing these assumptions 
shows that reflections on the nature of pluralism are a red herring with 
respect to arguments for political toleration:  in making such arguments, we 
must focus instead on the character of pluralism.   
 
3.  Toleration and the Nature of Pluralism 
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 Pluralism is a view about the nature of the differences between people 
to which personal attitudes and political principles of toleration respond. 
Pluralists argue that many differences between values, ends and options are 
incommensurable in two important senses.  First, many different values, 
practices, ends, or forms of association are not realisable within the life of a 
single person or a single community (the thesis of practical incompatibility).  
And second, that it makes no sense, or is inappropriate, to compare many 
different values, practices, ends or forms of association in terms of their value 
(the thesis of evaluative incomparability).4  For Raz, the ‘mark of 
incommensurability’ is a failure of transitivity with respect to the value of 
certain options (ends, values, practices etc.).5 
 
                                                
4 See I. Berlin, ‘The pursuit of the ideal’, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London, 
Fontana Press, 1990); ‘The decline of utopian ideas in the west’, The Crooked Timber of 
Humanity; ‘Two concepts of liberty’, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1969).  See also J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986) 
and ‘Incommensurability and agency’, in R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, 
Incomparability and Practical Reason  (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 
1997); C. Taylor, ‘Leading a life’, in R. Chang (ed.),Incommensurability, Incomparability 
and Practical Reason; B. Williams, ‘Conflicts of values’, Moral Luck:  Philosophical Papers 
1973-1980 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
5   Raz writes only of options being incommensurable, but as options involve practices, 
forms of association, values and beliefs, his account of incommensurability can be 
extended to cover this range of differences to which personal and political toleration 
responds. 
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Two valuable options are incommensurable if (1) neither is better than 
the other, and (2) there is (or could be) another option which is better 
than one but is not better than the other.6 
 
 Taking two options, A and B, the failure of transitivity in (1) shows 
that A and B per se cannot compared in terms of their value, and the failure of 
transitivity in (2) shows that there is no master-value C which enables 
comparison of A and B in terms of their value.  Raz’s account of evaluative 
incomparability improves on Isaiah Berlin’s famous account.  Berlin took the 
denial of evaluative incomparability to imply the assertion of a master-value 
making possible evaluative comparisons.  But Raz makes it clear that options 
are incommensurable both when they cannot be ranked by reference to a 
master-value, and when they simply cannot be ranked.7  The denial of 
evaluative incomparability does not imply the assertion of a master-value. 
 
 The argument from pluralism for political principles of toleration is as 
follows. 
 
(1)  Given incommensurability conflict between those with different ends and 
values is a permanent feature of the world.   
                                                
6   J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom , p. 325. 
7  On Berlin’s conflation of commensurability and value monism see J. Griffin, 
‘Incommensurability:  what’s the problem?’, in R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, 
Incomparability and Practical Reason , p. 36; and J. Griffin,Well-Being:  Its Meaning, 
Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 89-92. 
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(2)  Given incommensurability it is illegitimate to impose certain values and 
ends on people by restricting their negative liberty in such a way as to force 
or encourage the adoption of other preferred values and ends.8   
(3)  Therefore, repression and official discouragement are illegitimate.  
Political principles of toleration are the least to which we ought to be 
committed.   
 
 The argument is that if differences between people are inevitable and 
incommensurable then political principles of toleration will always be 
necessary to ensure that those with power do not use coercive force or 
propaganda to illegitimately attempt to eradicate those who differ from them.  
Political principles of toleration are necessary for preserving peace, stability 
and justice between people divided by incommensurable differences.9  This 
argument for toleration only succeeds given a commitment to individual 
freedom as negative in Berlin’s sense.10  As my interest here is in the liberal 
tradition, and all liberals place some value on negative liberty, I will not 
address this commitment (although we might ask what the truth of the thesis 
of evaluative incomparability  would add to the normative injunction in (2)).  
Instead, I want to focus on a more serious flaw in the argument. 
 
 Political toleration is a response to disliked and disapproved of 
differences.  However, the argument from pluralism does not establish that 
incommensurable differences will prompt dislike or disapproval.  The two 
                                                
8  See I. Berlin, ‘Two concepts of liberty’. 
9  For analysis of Berlin’s version of  this argument see G. Crowder, ‘Pluralism and 
Liberalism’, Political Studies XLII:  2 (1994).  See also I. Berlin and B. Williams, ‘Pluralism 
and Liberalism:  A Reply’, Political Studies XLII:  2 (1994). 
10  See I. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. 
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theses of incommensurability appearing as premises in the argument from 
pluralism assert the existence of ineradicable and evaluatively incomparable 
differences:  they address the nature of pluralism.  What they do not establish 
is the character of the disagreements between those separated by 
incommensurable differences.  It could be the case that the two theses of 
incommensurability are true and yet political toleration is unnecessary:  those 
separated by incommensurable differences might not dislike and disapprove 
of one another.  Or it could be the case that the two theses of 
incommensurability are false and political toleration is necessary:  those 
separated by commensurable differences might dislike and disapprove of one 
another.  Given that the two theses of incommensurability do not establish 
that those separated by incommensurable differences will dislike and 
disapprove of one another, the argument for toleration from pluralism is a 
red herring.  To understand the need for toleration, and the prospects for 
transcending it, requires an account of the character of pluralism.  The focus 
of this account will be what personal attitudes towards disliked and 
disapproved of others can reasonably be expected of people.  All arguments 
for political principles of toleration and beyond must operate with some 
assumptions about the character of pluralism.  Examination of these 
assumptions as they appear in the work of Rawls and Raz explains their 
different approaches to the justification of political principles. 
 
4.  The Character of Pluralism:  The Rawlsian picture 
 
 On Rawls’ view, the values of political justification are derived from 
the exercise of persons’ practical reason as it addresses principles securing the 
conditions for peaceful and profitable co-operation in political society.  
According to Rawls, people so conceived will address one another in public 
reason when attempting to solve their political problems.  Rawls’ conception 
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of justice is justified to the extent that these expectations are legitimate.  The 
only resources Rawls has for political justification are these expectations; 
Rawls denies that he need invoke any values beyond these expectations in 
order to justify his political principles.  For citizens to address one another in 
public reason demands that they move beyond the personal attitude of 
toleration to attitudes of engagement.  
 
 For Rawls, a stable and just society is one in which there is an 
overlapping consensus among reasonable citizens on a conception of justice.  
Given the fact that pluralism is permanent, this conception of justice cannot 
be justified by reference to any one comprehensive moral, religious, or 
philosophical doctrine.  Citizens who differ on questions of doctrine can 
nevertheless reach an overlapping consensus on a conception of justice by 
debating political questions in public reason.  When citizens address one 
another in public reason they present their proposals to one another in terms 
which they reasonably expect one another to understand and accept, and are 
disposed to act on proposals agreed in public reason, given the assurance that 
all other citizens will also act on these principles. 
 
The point of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct 
their fundamental discussions within the framework of what each 
regards as a political conception of justice based on values that others 
can reasonably be expected to endorse, and each is, in good faith, 
prepared to defend that conception so understood.11 
 
 When citizens achieve the ideal of public reason they ‘think of 
themselves as if they were legislators’ in order to consider which principles 
                                                
11  J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 226. 
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and policies they would adopt using pubic reason.12  If they find a 
discrepancy between the principles and policies they would adopt in public 
reason, and the principles and policies adopted by their actual political 
representatives, then they have a duty to use democratic means to change the 
way in which their representatives legislate.   
 
 Rawls’ public reason demands a personal attitude of engagement 
because it is realised in a process of deliberation between citizens.  For a 
person to determine how to present  her political proposals in public reason, 
where these proposals are informed by her religious, moral and philosophical 
beliefs, requires that she attempt to understand the religious, moral and 
philosophical beliefs informing the political proposals of others.  Until she 
engages with others in this way she cannot engage in public reason.  
Admittedly, the degree of personal engagement demanded by Rawls’ ideal of 
public reason is limited to the political sphere.  But given that citizens’ 
political proposals are informed by their non-political values and beliefs, 
public reason can demand a substantial degree of engagement with others on 
non-political issues.13   
 
When citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their 
supporting reasons concerning public political questions.  They 
suppose that their political opinions may be revised by discussion with 
                                                
12  J. Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited’, in S. Freeman (ed.) John Rawls:  Collected 
Papers, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 577. 
13  See B. Herman, ‘The community of moral judgement’, in D. Heyd (ed.), Toleration:  An 
Elusive Virtue (REF) 
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other citizens:  and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed 
outcome of their existing private or nonpolitical interests.14 
 
 Rawls’ description of how overlapping consensus might arise reveals a 
dynamic conception of relations between citizens in political community.  In 
discussion of the sixteenth century wars of religion he claims that the 
resolution of these wars with principles of religious toleration was not a 
result of an overlapping consensus on these principles, but rather the result of 
a certain balance of power (and some exhaustion) establishing a modus 
vivendi.15  Rawls argues that from such modus vivendi it is possible to move 
through a constitutional consensus to an overlapping consensus, and that 
moving through these stages of consensus stimulates important changes in 
citizens attitudes to one another.16   
 
 In a modus vivendi citizens exhausted by war acquiesce to certain 
political principles of toleration.  Recognising that these principles secure the 
                                                
14  J. Rawls, ‘The idea of public reason revisited’, p. 580.  It is important to be clear that my 
claims about engagement public reason do not rest on a conflation of what Rawls calls 
‘reasoning from conjecture’.  A person engaging in this form of reasoning with another 
attempts to reason from what she conjectures to be the other person’s beliefs, values etc. to 
a particular conclusion:  she can then present this chain of reasoning to the other person as 
a reason for her to accept this conclusion.  See J. Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited’, p. 594.  My claim here is rather that for a person to present her own proposals 
in public reason requires that she attempt to understand the different views of others 
whom she addresses. 
15  J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 148.  That Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration does not 
consist of arguments made in public reason lends support to Rawls’ claim. 
16  J. Cohen, ‘A more democratic liberalism’, Michigan Law Review, 92 (YEAR). 
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important good of political stability for themselves and those they care for, 
citizens reach a constitutional consensus by coming to agree on liberal 
political principles guaranteeing certain basic political rights necessary for 
safeguarding democratic electoral procedures.  Consensus on such a 
constitution requires the limited use of public reason:  citizens affirm the 
constitution as a good for themselves and their fellow citizens disregarding 
the balance of power between them.   
 
 The move from constitutional to overlapping consensus involves a 
broadening of the scope of the consensus and a deepening of the relations 
between the conception of justice and citizens’ conceptions of the good.17  
Once stable constitutional consensus is established, citizens make their 
political claims through the democratic procedures established by the 
constitution.  Within the framework of minimal political rights necessary for a 
stable democracy citizens discuss wider and more controversial questions of 
political inclusion and official encouragement.  These involve a discussion of 
the distribution of rights to freedom of thought, expression and association 
per se, questions of distributive justice, the distribution of power and 
opportunity in society, and access to the social bases of self-respect.  Citizens 
addressing one another in public reason on these questions of political 
inclusion and official encouragement must engage with one another on a 
level deeper than that required by stable constitutional consensus, because 
the questions of justice they discuss intersect with their comprehensive 
doctrines to a much greater degree than constitutional essentials.  For 
example, in a diverse society there is likely to be far more disagreement over 
the appropriate patterns of economic redistribution than over the principle of 
universal suffrage.  Overlapping consensus emerges when citizens agree on 
                                                
17  J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 164-8. 
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principles of justice to govern, not just the distribution of political rights 
attaching to democratic procedures, but also matters relating to the basic 
structure of society:  its main political, social, and economic institutions.18  
Citizens moving towards overlapping consensus on political principles 
beyond toleration must adopt personal attitudes of engagement which 
demand more than toleration.19   
 
 To sum up, that Rawls’ central justificatory tool -- public reason -- 
requires engagement on the part of citizens separated by differences shows 
that Rawls conceives of the ideal character of pluralism as non-hostile.  
Hostility involves a turning away from or rejection of another person:  those 
separated by differences prompting hostility cannot engage in public reason.  
Debate in Rawls’ public reason is only possible between those who differ -- 
often to the extent of disliking and disapproving of one another -- and yet 
who are willing to make attempts at interpretation and understanding.  The 
success of Rawlsian political justification relies on the claim that citizens 
ought to adopt attitudes of engagement.  If it can be shown that citizens are 
incapable of adopting these attitudes, or ought not to adopt them, then the 
justification of liberal principles must proceed according to a different model. 
 
5.  The Character of Pluralism:  The Razian picture 
 
                                                
18  J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 158-68. 
19  Rawls describes the forms of engagement needed for what he calls a ‘reasonable moral 
psychology’ in terms of a willingness to propose and abide by fair principles of justice, the 
maintenance of trust and confidence given sustained and successful social co-operation, 
and the willingness to participate in social arrangements so as to support them.  Political 
Liberalism, p. 86. 
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 Raz’s argument for political principles beyond toleration invokes the 
value of personal autonomy rather than the expectation that individuals 
themselves move beyond the personal attitude of toleration.  On Raz’s view, 
an appeal to perfectionist values in political justification is necessary because 
the competitive character of pluralism makes any expectations that people 
move beyond the personal attitude of toleration illegitimate.  If this is true 
then our expectations of persons ought not to inform our justification of 
political principles beyond toleration, and Rawlsian Constructivism in 
political justification is called into question. 
 
Competitive pluralism not only admits the validity of distinct and 
incompatible moral virtues, but also of virtues which tend, given 
human nature, to encourage intolerance of other virtues.  That is, 
competitive pluralism admits the value of virtues possession of which 
normally leads to a tendency not to suffer certain limitations in other 
people which are themselves inevitable if those people possess certain 
other, equally valid, virtues.20 
 
 The two theses of incommensurability asserted by Raz establish the 
inevitability of differences between persons in possession of different sets of 
virtues, and that evaluative comparisons between the options to which these 
virtues attach is often inappropriate.  The claim that Raz adds to these theses 
with his characterisation of pluralism as competitive is that these conflicts 
will be accompanied by certain ‘appropriate emotional or attitudunal 
concomitants or components’ which make personal attitudes of engagement 
                                                
20  J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 404. 
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inappropriate.21  This is a claim about the character, rather than the nature, of 
pluralism. 
 
Conflict is endemic ... pluralists can step back from their personal 
commitments and appreciate in the abstract the value of other ways of 
life and their attendant virtues.  But this acknowledgement coexists 
with, and cannot replace, the feelings of rejection and dismissiveness 
towards what one know is in itself valuable.  Tension is an inevitable 
concomitant of accepting the truth of value pluralism.22 
 
 Raz thinks that in conditions of competitive pluralism the most we can 
legitimately ask of people whose ineradicable conflict with one another 
reaches beyond their values, beliefs, practices etc. to their moral emotions is 
the personal attitude of toleration.  Given that the moral emotions attaching 
to conflicts between incommensurables are, according to Raz, entirely 
appropriate and not to be revised once an all-things considered judgement 
about the conflict has been made by the agent, we cannot expect more of 
people than that they refrain from acting on these emotions.  Raz claims,  
 
I am not simply wrong in inclining to be intolerant of another persons’ 
meanness or vulgarity.  These rightly trigger intolerant responses.  A 
person who does not react to them in this way is lacking in moral 
sensibility.  Yet it is a response which should be curbed.23 
 
                                                
21   J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 405. 
22  J. Raz, ‘Multiculturalism:  a liberal perspective’, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 165. 
23  J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 404. 
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 It is important to note that by characterising pluralism as competitive 
Raz is not simply making the claim that engagement has limits.  All thinkers 
can agree on this point.  By registering the sorts of differences which Raz 
thinks breed appropriate hostility it becomes clear that he conceives of 
pluralism as competitive both at the edges and at the centre.  Ordinary vices 
like vulgarity, cultural differences, and even professional differences are 
Raz’s examples of characteristics for which ‘attitudunal concomitants’ of 
hostility are appropriate.24  Hostility in Raz’s competitive pluralism is not 
simply reserved -- as it should be -- for very bad people.  Hostility permeates 
relations between those with different cultures, religions, professions, and 
weaknesses. 
 
 If toleration is the most we can ask of people as a personal attitude in 
conditions of competitive pluralism can political principles beyond toleration 
be justified?  Not on a model of political justification whereby principles are 
constructed from our reasonable expectations of citizens.  But once the 
justification of political principles is detached from what we can legitimately 
expect of citizens, political principles beyond toleration become justifiable 
even when we can expect nothing but toleration from citizens.   
 
 Raz’s argument for political principles of official encouragement -- his 
multiculturalism -- does not rely on the expectation that individuals as 
citizens ought to cultivate attitudes of engagement.25 Raz’s argument for 
multiculturalism is consistent with the possibility that no person adopts an 
attitude of engagement towards those whom she dislikes and of whom she 
disapproves.  Rather than offering multiculturalist principles as the object of 
                                                
24  See J. Raz, ‘Multiculturalism:  a liberal perspective’. 
25  See J. Raz, ‘Multiculturalism:  a liberal perspective’. 
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an overlapping consensus between citizens discussing political questions in 
public reason, Raz argues for these principles by reference to the value of 
protecting the conditions of personal autonomy for all, which he takes to be a 
political value independent of expectations about how citizens ought to 
regard this value.26  Raz conceives of personal autonomy as achievable only 
in conditions in which a person has a certain minimum of mental faculties, a 
variety of adequate options from which to choose goals which will contribute 
to her well-being, and a degree of freedom from coercion.  A principle of 
toleration (the ‘harm principle’) ensures freedom from coercion, and 
multiculturalist principles protect a variety of meaningful cultural options. 
 
 Raz’s characterisation of pluralism as inevitably, appropriately and 
deeply competitive makes the expectation that citizens move beyond the 
personal attitude of toleration in their political discourse illegitimate.  This 
characterisation of pluralism forces liberals to adopt forms of political 
justification which trace connections between moral values and political 
principles independent of the question of what sorts of attitudes we can 
expect from citizens.   
 
 If Rawls is right about the character of pluralism then it is not clear 
why we should invoke Perfectionist values in justification of political 
principles beyond toleration.  If Raz is right about the character of pluralism 
then we cannot avoid invoking Perfectionist values in justification of political 
principles beyond toleration.  To decide between these two approaches we 
                                                
26  ‘The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life.  the ideal of personal autonomy 
is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it 
through successive decisions throughout their lives’.  J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 
369 
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need to know who is right about the character of pluralism.  I shall not 
attempt to establish this here.  Instead, I shall lay out some considerations 
which each side might invoke in defence of its characterisation of pluralism. 
 
6.  The Prospects for Engagement 
 
 There are two broad ways of understanding Raz’s claims about the 
competitive nature of pluralism.  One relates to human nature, and the other 
relates to the appropriateness of competition in pluralism independent of 
facts about human nature. 
 
 The first way of understanding the claim about the competitiveness of 
pluralism is as a claim about human nature:  human psychology makes 
engagement between those who dislike and disapprove of one another, if not 
impossible, then rare and difficult.  If human nature makes certain attitudes 
inevitable even in the best of conditions then the justification of political 
principles must not demand that these attitudes are overcome.  Human 
nature means that dislike and disapproval breed repulsion, dismissal, and 
avoidance, all of which mitigate against engagement.  Raz seems to make this 
claim in stating that ‘[c]ompetitive pluralism not only admits the validity of 
distinct and incompatible moral virtues, but also of virtues which tend, given 
human nature, to encourage intolerance of other virtues.’27   
 
 This account of the competitive character of pluralism relies on a brute 
claim about human nature:  human psychology makes engagement between 
those who dislike and disapprove of one another rare and difficult.  This 
sweeping claim will be difficult to defend.  But Raz’s political Perfectionism 
                                                
27  J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 404. 
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can be supported by a far more modest claim about the impossibility, or 
rarity and extreme difficulty, of engagement with disliked or disapproved of 
others in the political realm in order to discuss questions of justice.  If this claim 
is true then any form of political justification reliant  on the expectation that 
citizens will engage in public reason to discuss political questions is 
threatened. 
 
 Such engagement in the political sphere probably is rare and difficult; 
but the fact that something is difficult does not mean that it is not required or 
appropriate.  Furthermore, it is not clear that the best explanation for this fact 
is that human nature prevents such engagement at the political level.  As 
Cohen and Rawls point out, liberal political institutions and procedures 
educate citizens to democratic citizenship.28  If human nature is not opposed 
to engagement per se, they argue, then moving from modus vivendi through 
constitutional consensus to overlapping consensus brings about changes in 
citizens enabling them to engage with one another in public reason.  The 
requirement that citizens engage in public reason is most pressing when a 
democratic political culture has evolved against the background of an 
overlapping consensus.  Although we have not yet experienced a political 
community which approximates to this ideal, the expectation that citizens 
engage in public reason can remain central to political justification in virtue of 
the claim that, by so engaging, people create political institutions which better 
enable them to engage, and that a political community organised around 
these institutions is more peaceful and profitable than one without these 
institutions.  On this view, we might argue that the reason why it is rare to 
find citizens engaging in public reason is not that human nature as it is 
realised in political life mitigates against this; rather -- being charitable -- we 
                                                
28  J. Cohen, ‘A more democratic liberalism’; J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 71.   
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might claim that many states have simply failed to move beyond modus 
vivendi, or have failed to achieve the right constitutional consensus, in which 
case the conditions in which it becomes easier for people to engage in public 
reason are missing.  As these failures are corrected the expectation that 
citizens address one another in public reason becomes more insistent, 
although on this picture the expectation is always legitimate.  An alternative, 
uncharitable, explanation of this failure might be that people are just too lazy 
and weak-willed to do what is required of them qua citizens. 
 
 The second way of reading Raz on competitive pluralism is as making 
a purely normative claim:  the attitudes that thwart engagement are 
appropriate or desirable independent of any facts about human nature which 
make these attitudes inevitable.  It is hard to envisage an arguments for the 
appropriateness of attitudes that thwart engagement in the absence of claims 
about how human nature opposes engagement.  Such an argument would 
have to establish that it is appropriate that, for example, soldiers hate 
students, that corporate raiders sneer at conservationists, and that priests 
damn prostitutes.  Apart from the fact that these are not typical -- perhaps not 
even common -- attitudes of the first type of person to the second type, it is 
not clear in what sense these attitudes could be claimed to be appropriate.  
Are they morally desirable?  Are they necessary virtues of participation in the 
life to which they attach?29  Are they cognitively appropriate to ensure some 
                                                
29  This interpretation is suggested by the following extract from J. Raz, ‘Free Expression and 
Personal Identification’, Ethics in the Public Domain :   
A Christian can approve of the way of life of the Muslim, and vice versa ... But not 
without reservations.  There are aspects of the other’s practices, attitudes, and beliefs 
that each of them must take exception to, must disagree with.  Disagreement, 
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sort of coherence in a person’s mental life?  Each of these readings of the pure 
normative claim would be difficult to support, but they all have the same 
counter-intuitive implication.  Soldiers who like students, corporate raiders 
who praise conservationists, and priests who bless prostitutes fail to have 
attitudes which they ought to have.  Defending this implication on any 
reading of the pure normative interpretation will be a tall order. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, I have argued that strategies of justification with respect 
political principles of toleration and beyond are shaped by conceptions of the 
character of pluralism, as opposed to conceptions of its nature.  This means 
that assessment of these competing strategies must focus on claims about 
what can reasonably be expected of persons in conditions of pluralism.  Until 
we have a way of settling this question, the jury must remain out with respect 
to the question of whether political principles should be justified by reference 
to a true moral theory, or instead by reference to the imperatives of practical 




                                                                                                                                      
condemnation, and even hostility to certain aspects of rival ways of life is an essential 
element of each way life.  (pp. 150-1) 
See also A. MacIntyre, ‘Toleration and the Goods of Conflict’, in S. Mendus (ed.) The Politics 
of Toleration (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 
 
